Stoic Ethics does not depend upon Physics
Julius Annas' critique of the "foundationalist" misreading of traditional Stoicism
Debates about Stoic Ethics sometimes become quite heated online, with a handful of individuals passionately insisting that “Modern Stoicism” is not real “Stoicism” insofar as it, they claim, ignores Stoic Physics. They typically insist that “traditional” Stoicism is synonymous with the view that, in some sense, Stoic Ethics is logically founded upon, or depends upon, Stoic Physics.
First of all, of course, the term “Modern Stoicism” denotes a broad church perspective encompassing everyone today who’s interested in Stoicism. It includes agnostics, atheists, and people of all religious persuasions — including, paradoxically, all of the individuals describing themselves as “traditional” Stoics. Indeed, the nonprofit, responsible for Stoic Week and the annual Stoicon conferences, which first popularized the term, has always been careful to explicitly define the term “Modern Stoicism” as follows:
Modern Stoicism is understood by us as a blanket term, referring to the use of Stoicism in the modern world. This term is intended to be inclusive and to encompass different interpretations and applications of Stoicism. Those involved may hold different religious views, for instance, agnostic, atheist, pantheist, theist. Everyone is welcome to be part of our community and to participate in our events and online activities. — modernstoicism.com/about-us
Nevertheless, I am frequently contacted by individuals who have recently started reading about Stoicism, or journalists wishing to write about it, who are confused by the arguments they see online. They have read some people saying that real “Stoicism” requires belief in ancient Stoic Physics because, they claim, the Ethics logically depends upon belief in Providence, and so on. This claim is nowhere to be found, however, in the surviving Stoic literature. I would describe it as an attempt at gatekeeping who is allowed to talk about Stoicism. And I think it’s a shame if that puts newcomers off learning about a philosophy that has helped countless thousands of individuals over the centuries, and continues to help many more people today.
So in this article, I’d like to address one of the central philosophical claims made by individuals claiming that “Modern Stoicism” is not real “Stoicism”, as they define it. It turns out that, according to most modern academic experts on Stoicism, the account of “traditional Stoicism” being promoted online is not, in fact, what traditional Stoics really believed.
The Foundationalist Error
I’m going to focus on the work of a leading academic expert on ancient philosophy who wrote an excellent philosophical article designed specifically to refute what she claims is a widespread misreading of traditional Stoicism. This mistake is best illustrated by considering a well-known passage from Diogenes Laertius, which says:
No part is separate from another, as some of the Stoics say; instead, the parts are blended together. And they used to teach them in combination. — Diogenes Laertius, 7.40, italics added
It is frequently cited by people online who claim that it proves that no ancient Stoics rejected Physics, and that Stoic Ethics is logically founded upon, and depends upon, Stoic Physics.
I hope, first of all, that simply pausing to examine the text closely should make it evident that it says only “some of the Stoics” and not “all of the Stoics”. That is partly because the author, in the very next chapter of his book, names Aristo of Chios and his followers among the Stoics who were well-known in antiquity for rejecting this position. That’s incidental to the point at stake in this, article, though. What I will focus on is the mistaken belief that this passage proves Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus and “some” other important Stoics posited a logical dependence of Ethics on Physics.
The notion is that because some Stoics taught Logic, Physics and Ethics as blended topics, it somehow follows that Ethics depends logically on Physics. This should, I think, also strike us immediately as a problematic interpretation of the text. If that is indeed what the founders of Stoicism meant, they would appear to be committed also to the converse logical relationship: that Stoic Physics and Logic are somehow logically founded upon Stoic Ethics. It may be that some people wish to defend that view, but it’s not one normally attributed to the Stoics. (In which case, the interpretation is vulnerable to the reductio ad absurdum, i.e., it leads to a conclusion that, in most cases, the person asserting it would find absurd.)
In her 2007 article, Ethics in Stoic Philosophy, Annas focuses on disputing precisely the interpretation of Stoicism that asserts its Ethics is logically derived from its Physics. This “foundationalist” position is taken for granted online by people claiming it is synonymous with what they consider to be traditional Stoicism. Annas, however, considers this to be based upon a serious misinterpretation of Stoic Ethics:
I shall now look at a modern interpretative strategy that finds one of the parts, physics, to be foundational for another part, ethics. I argue that this strategy fits the ancient texts poorly and raises serious theoretical problems.
Instead, she claims that it is more consistent with the textual evidence to conclude that the orthodox or traditional position in ancient Stoicism was that Ethics, Physics and Logic were blended in teaching because of their mutual explanatory value, as part of a holistic system of philosophy, but they were not strictly logically dependent on another. She writes:
Nothing in the integrated picture supports the view that one of the parts is dependent on another.
She explicitly states that contrary to the common reading of the passage above, and other remarks from Diogenes Laertius, this means that Zeno and the majority of orthodox Stoics did not believe that studying Stoic Physics, or accepting its principles, was logically foundational to Stoic Ethics, but rather that it was extremely valuable for achieving a full understanding and appreciation their doctrines. She writes:
It would hardly be appropriate to take him [Diogenes Laertius] as introducing foundations for the claims about living in accordance with virtue.
That attitude is very explicitly demonstrated by Marcus Aurelius who clearly places great value on Stoic theological and metaphysical beliefs but, nevertheless, asserts repeatedly (about nine times) in the Meditations that Stoic Ethics would still be justified with Stoic Physics. Prof. Annas concludes, based on her analysis of the literature, that this was, in fact, the position commonly espoused in traditional Stoicism from Zeno onward, although few serious scholars feel comfortable making rigid generalizations about what all ancient Stoics believed.
Annas refers to the assertion that Stoic Ethics logically depends upon Stoic Physics as the “foundationalist” reading, because it assumes that Ethics requires Physics as its logical foundation. One of her main pieces of evidence in this regard is the observation that Stoic ethical arguments, which are well documented in modern scholarship, do not often employ premises derived from Stoic Physics.
The ethical part of philosophy is the study of certain topics such as impulse, virtue, emotion, the sage and so on. These topics are not defined in terms of or derived from pneuma and matter, or Providence. They have to be defined and discussed in their own terms.
In other words, we can see that the Stoics, who frequently defend their Ethics, clearly do not often do so by appeal to their Physics, and that simple fact, she notes, appears to directly contradict the foundationalist reading of Stoic Ethics.
Modern Stoicism
Toward the end of the article, Annas concludes that it is “clearly a mistake” for modern “interpreters” of Stoicism who assert that Stoic Ethics requires belief in Providence, and related parts of Physics, to complain that those who study Stoic Ethics alone are wrong for doing so. She writes:
Some scholars and interpreters discuss ‘Stoic ethics’ using, in ancient terms, the ethical part of Stoic philosophy. For others ‘Stoic ethics’ corresponds in ancient terms to the ethical part of Stoic philosophy plus the providential part of Stoic physics. As explained above, both approaches are legitimate and mutually enriching. It is clearly a mistake, however (one not always avoided) for proponents of the latter approach to complain that the former approach does not do justice to the ancient evidence.
Online proponents of the foundationalist reading of Stoicism often insist that their interpretation of “traditional” Stoicism is the only viable one. They frequently claim that their position is supported by academic scholarship. However, this is not the case. The non-foundational reading is the dominant one in contemporary Stoic scholarship and is shared by a broad range of scholars, including Pierre Hadot, John Sellars, Christopher Gill, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Margaret Graver, and Malcolm Schofield. While these scholars differ in emphasis and method, they converge upon rejection of the claim that Stoic Ethics is logically grounded in Stoic Physics.
Marcus certainly did believe in Providence; he did not believe that one needs to believe in Providence, though, in order to believe in Stoic Ethics.
For example, Chris Fisher, one of the leading proponents of “traditional” Stoicism, and a vocal critic of what he calls “modern Stoicism”, had a lengthy exchange with me several years ago where he insisted that Marcus Aurelius believed Stoic Ethics is logically founded upon Stoic Physics, and repeatedly appealed to the French scholar Pierre Hadot to support this claim. My position has always been that Marcus himself believed in Providence and thought this was a valuable and important part of Stoic philosophy but, nevertheless, Marcus also denied belief in Providence was logically necessary to support Stoic Ethics. He asserts this in the form of what scholars call the “God or atoms” argument around nine times, in fact, throughout the Meditations. Hadot wrote of this argument:
Whatever modern historians may claim, the dilemma “either providence or chance,” when used by Seneca or by Marcus Aurelius, does not signify either the renunciation of Stoic physical theories or an eclectic attitude which refuses to decide between Epicureanism and Stoicism. In fact, we can see that Marcus has already made his choice between Epicureanism and Stoicism, by the very way in which he describes the Epicurean model with a variety of pejorative terms… — Hadot, The Inner Citadel, p. 149
Again, to make this as clear as possible, everyone agrees that Marcus is not renouncing Stoic Physics in these passages but, as Hadot observes, he is nevertheless asserting repeatedly that Stoic Ethics can be logically justified independently of Stoic Physics. Marcus certainly did believe in Providence; he did not believe that one needs to believe in Providence, though, in order to believe in Stoic Ethics.
We find the same “God or atoms” argument in Seneca and even in a fragment attributed to Epictetus. Hadot therefore concludes that this appears to have been a familiar argument to Imperial era Stoics.
Such arguments are obviously not Marcus’ inventions. When he first speaks about them, he makes only a brief allusion to them, as if he were speaking of a well-known school-doctrine (“Remember the disjunction…”) without bother to set forth the entire chain of reasoning. — Hadot, The Inner Citadel, p. 149
Indeed, it’s likely that this argument predates Seneca, who also seems to take it for granted, and may even go back therefore to one of the scholarchs of the Stoic school, or at least one of its prominent authors. In any case, Hadot does not argue that Marcus believed Stoic Ethics depends logically upon Stoic Physics. On the contrary, he interprets Marcus as providing us with evidence that Marcus was very familiar with a long-established argument denying that Stoic Physics is logically required to justify Stoic Ethics.
Christopher Gill, the founder of the Modern Stoicism nonprofit, provides a book-length analysis of the Stoic conception of Nature, and hence Physics, in Learning to Live Naturally (2022). He explicitly aligns himself with Annas’ critique, although he substitutes the term “authoritative” for “foundational”. After a careful analysis of the textual evidence, he concludes:
The Stoic worldview, or the idea of universal nature, is not presented as essential or indispensable for the core Stoic ethical claims, as is brought out in the preceding discussion of the ethical summaries. Although these claims are sometimes supported by reference to universal nature, or by an account of human nature viewed in a larger natural framework, this is not always the case, as it would need to be if universal nature constituted the indispensable foundation. Also, even when there is reference to universal nature, the core Stoic ethical claims are not derived from this idea in the way that, in these modern examples, moral rules or norms are, systematically, derived from God, the Categorical Imperative, or the principle of human benefit. — Gill, 2022
However, Gill arrives at a more nuanced conclusion:
Hence, despite the initial impression given by [certain key] passages, they do not support the view often maintained that physics (especially theology) is foundational for ethics. However, they do support the weaker, but more plausible, claim that ideas from Stoic theology can be used, along with the idea of human nature, to support and inform distinctive and central ethical claims. These passages are also consistent with the idea that the three main branches of Stoic knowledge, while having their own areas of authority, can be combined with each other in a co-ordinated and partly reciprocal way in order to yield the theoretical unity and cohesion at which the Stoics aim. — Gill, 2022
Still, on this reading of the Stoics, the study of Physics, and their doctrine of Providence, may be valuable for Ethics, but it is not logically necessary.
The most vigorous defender of Stoic foundationalism is perhaps Fisher, who is not an academic philosopher but styles himself “Scholarch” of an organization called the College of Stoic Philosophers. Fisher, and his College, are the main proponents of what they call “traditional” Stoicism. (I consider this a misnomer because their views appear to me to be fundamentally at odds with the real teachings of traditional Stoicism.) Fisher therefore asserts that Stoic Physics is not only very relevant and important today but that it is, in his words, “foundational” and “essential” to ancient Stoic Ethics.
The Stoics recognized there is an intelligence in the order of the cosmos which infers meaning to our lives. Unfortunately, this idea is not given consideration by the majority of moderns studying and practicing Stoicism. Thus, the twenty-first century popularization of Stoicism is occurring without any discussion of providence in spite of the fact that this concept was traditionally considered essential. In part, this is a byproduct of our secular age. The concept of providence evokes religious connotations and turns many moderns away without further consideration. Additionally, many modern popularizers of Stoicism are themselves atheists and are therefore steering modern Stoicism away from its foundational teachings in physics and theology and toward a recently envisioned secularized version of Stoic ethics. This is unfortunate primarily because providence plays a central role in Stoic practice and psychological well-being. — Fisher, Providence or Atoms? Providence!, italics added
Fisher, in other words, assumes that for “traditional” Stoicism, Stoic Physics was “central”, “essential” and even (literally) “foundational” compared to Stoic Ethics. He makes this claim very emphatically, over and over again, because he employs it as a means of criticizing modern proponents or students of Stoicism, who do not believe in Providence:
Regrettably, many object to providence without giving it full consideration. This may be due to its religious implications, or because they simply do not realize how essential providence is to Stoic ethical theory and practice. — Fisher, Providence or Atoms? Providence!, italics added
As we have seen, however, Annas and indeed most modern academics, reject precisely this “foundationalist” interpretation of Stoicism, and consider it a serious misreading of the ancient literature. (Incidentally, Fisher’s claim that “many” modern popularizers of Stoicism are atheists is not accurate, in my experience, for the simple reason that most modern philosophers tend to be agnostics rather than atheists — an important distinction.)
A.A. Long is often cited as the leading example of a modern academic who remains more aligned with a foundationalist reading of Stoicism. However, Long himself does not agree with Stoic Physics, which he considers outdated, and he describes the attempt to ground Stoic Ethics in Physics as a “Noble Error”.
I am not a Stoic, for more reasons than are stated or hinted at in this book. But their philosophy has fascinated me now for thirty years. Of all the Greek schools, Stoicism was the most ambitious in its quest for a system that would explain how human nature fits into the world at large. That project, which has beguiled many subsequent philosophers, seems to me to be vulnerable to the evidence of history, cultural diversity and our continuing ignorance of the kind of animals we are. It is, none the less, a noble error. If the Stoics were too eager, as I think they were, to make cosmic order relevant to human values, they advanced numerous theories and concepts that are a continuing challenge to thought. — Long, Stoic Studies
Long is therefore far from being an ally of modern Stoics who seek to embrace what they deem to be “traditional” foundationalism. In his view, this is a doomed project. Indeed, he has expressed his surprise that sincere adherents of Stoic Physics could exist in the modern world. He has also conceded, with regard to Annas’ critique, that the ancient Stoics varied in their emphasis on Physics and the surviving texts often argues for key aspects of Stoic Ethics without any explicit reference to Physics.
The norm, however, over the past few decades, has been for rejection of foundationalism to become the dominant view among scholars of ancient Stoicism. On this reading, the ancient Stoics did not typically believe their Ethics logically depended on Physics, but rather that Physics lent valuable credence to Ethics, and vice versa. This is a crucial distinction because it would mean that Stoic Ethics can plausibly be defended from a modern secular perspective, without appealing to doctrines such as the ancient belief in Providence. Most contemporary academics are therefore more aligned with Annas’ position, which interprets Ethics as a logically distinct part of traditional Stoic philosophy, intelligible on its own terms and potentially enriched by, but not philosophically founded, on ancient Physics or theological doctrines about Providence. In practice, this matters because the vast majority of academics and non-academics alike who are drawn to the study of Stoicism today, and still find the core principles of its Ethics relevant, no longer accept certain core principles of Stoic Physics, such as the Argument from Design and belief in divine Providence.



Thanks Donald, for a cogent summary of a position I have long taken to be reasonable. I finished Chris Gill's book last year. It would be foolhardy to question the rigor with which he approached this question. His conclusions make room for those who apply a more spiritual lens to the Stoic worldview as well as those for whom providence and design are incompatible with a Physics that includes over 2000 years of scientific advancement. While I find spiritual arguments fail to meet the standard of plausible explanation based on evidence and reason that I require, I have no problem sharing a table with those who see otherwise, particularly when there is so much within Stoicism on which we can agree. I've yet to read a foundational text that lists zealous intolerance as a virtue.
Good read! I concur with this. While getting rid of Divine Providence may reframe certain ancient Stoic ideas such as “everything that happens in the world is good”, I don’t think that means Stoicism in general has to depend on such things. I think we can have Stoicism without the idea of Providence since much of the framework still holds.
I think this is basically what you say at the end about ethics and physics being related, but I do think ethics depends on physics in some sense—if we are to follow human nature, we ought to know what human nature is.
It doesn’t have to depend on any particular ideas about human nature or especially any particular ideas about modern chemistry, physics, etc.