How the Stoics Defined Anger
The conceptualization of anger in ancient philosophy
Our two main sources for Stoic theory are the chapter on Zeno in Diogenes Laertius’ Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers and a the sections on Stoicism in the Anthology of Johannes Stobaeus, which is believed to draw upon an earlier work summarizing doctrines by the philosopher Areus Didymos. First, I’ll look at the central definition of anger given in each of these two texts and then we’ll explore the distinctions they go on to make between different species of anger.
The Definition of Anger
First of all, we should note, that the Stoics define anger as a subcategory of desire. Desire is defined in Diogenes Laertius as “an irrational impulse” or urge (ὁρμὴ ἄλογος, hormē alogos). The main word used for anger in Stoicism is ὀργὴ (orgē) in Greek.
Anger is a desire for revenge on one who seems to have wronged us inappropriately. — Diogenes Laertius, Lives & Opinions, 7.1.113
[ὀργὴ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία τιμωρίας τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἠδικηκέναι οὐ προσηκόντως]
Alternatively, “Anger is a craving to punish someone who seems to have harmed us unjustly.” To be clear, this combines three closely-related judgments:
The belief that someone has harmed me, whether physically or by injuring my reputation or other interests.
The belief that he did so unjustly, i.e., he should not have done what he did.
The conclusion that he deserves to be punished, leading to my excessive urge or desire for revenge.
The Stoics believe that the first premise here, that I have been harmed, is false and irrational. Strictly speaking, nobody can truly harm us unless we permit them to do so. As Epictetus puts it, “People are distressed not by events but rather by their judgments about them.”
Our other main source, Stobaeus, defines anger in virtually the same language.
Anger, then, is a desire to take revenge on someone who appears to have wronged [you] contrary to what is appropriate. — Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.10c
However, he says a little more about the nature of desire, according to the Stoics.
Desire is a striving which is disobedient to reason; its cause is believing that a good is approaching, and that when it is here we shall do well by it; this opinion itself ‹that it really is worth striving for› has a ‹fresh› [power] to stimulate irregular motion. — Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.10b
This implies that anger is a desire disobedient to reason, caused by the belief that a good is approaching, presumably meaning that an angry person concludes that revenge is good. In other words, when I’m angry, I assume that it’s in my best interests, somehow, for my enemy to be punished, and made to suffer.
I think what Stobaeus means by a “fresh power” is that, while the impressions on which it’s based are still recent in time, anger has a pronounced physiological effect, which abates once the experience ceases to be “fresh”. For instance, anger initially makes our “blood boil” (an “irregular motion” or agitation in the body), or more literally our blood pressure often rises significantly and our heart beats faster, but these physiological symptoms of anger may fade over time, even though the angry thoughts and beliefs may remain with us. (Unless we do something to make the initial impressions feel “fresh” again, by dwelling on them, for instance.)
These definitions are attributed by Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus to “the Stoics”, which is typically taken to mean that they were introduced by the founders of Stoicism — either Zeno, Cleanthes, or Chrysippus — and adopted fairly consistently by later Stoics. For example, Seneca has an entire book titled On Anger, written in Latin, over three centuries after Stoicism was founded. However, he defines anger in the standard Stoic way, although perhaps building on earlier works and adding some nuance.
Anger is the desire to take vengeance for a wrong or, as Posidonius says, the desire to punish the person by whom you reckon you were unjustly harmed. — Seneca, On Anger, 1.2.3b
He adds: “Some have defined it this way: anger is the arousal of the mind to harm the person who has either harmed oneself or wished to do so.” Seneca later compares this to Aristotle’s definition:
Aristotle’s definition is not very different from ours: he says that anger is the strong desire to return pain for pain. — Seneca, On Anger, 1.3.3
Some scholars therefore attribute the original concept to Aristotle, although the Stoics do not appear to see themselves as influenced by Aristotle and, in fact, similar definitions appear in other ancient sources, such as the pseudo-Platonic Definitions, which contains the entry:
ὀργὴ: the urging of the passionate part of the soul for vengeance.
This broad consensus among philosophers of different schools suggests that the concept of anger as something akin to a desire for revenge may have been relatively common in the ancient world, e.g., even in tragedies, and other forms of literature.
Two Types of Anger
Incipient Anger
The Stoics also distinguished between several forms of anger. For example, Diogenes Laertius mentions an important distinction between anger (ὀργὴ) as a full-blown passion and the first flash of anger that someone experiences (θυμός).
And ‘incipient anger’ [θυμός] is anger just beginning. — Diogenes Laertius, Lives & Opinions, 7.1.114, modified
This term (θυμός, thumos) is more commonly translated as “spiritedness”, particularly in Plato’s Dialogues. Indeed, the Pseudo-Platonic Definitions explains its meaning as follows:
θυμός: forceful impulse of the non-rational part of the soul, without being ordered by reasoning and thought.
The Stoics, by contrast, believe that even these primitive emotional impulses are “ordered by thought” or cognitive in nature. They seem to use the word θυμός, in the passage quoted above, to denote one type of propatheia or “first movement” of a passion, in this case the first phase of anger. (So I have substituted the term ‘incipient anger’ as that seems better to capture the intended meaning in this passage.)
The Stoics believed that full-blown passions, such as anger, are preceded by an “impression”, which is verbal and cognitive in nature. These are involuntary and therefore viewed by the wise as natural and morally indifferent. They roughly correspond to what we might today describe as the automatic thoughts that occur during the initial phase of anger, and they’re followed by physical reactions, such as trembling or physical tension. This can also be compared to the concept of the “primary threat appraisal” and the “fight or flight response” in modern psychology. For the Stoics, these initial thoughts or impressions only escalate into full-blown anger when we give them conscious “assent”, buy into them, and allow ourselves to be swept along by them.
Chronic Anger
‘Chronic anger’ [μῆνις] is long-standing and spiteful anger which just waits for its chance, as is apparent in these lines [from Iliad 1.81–2]: ‘For even if he swallows his resentment for today, still he will retain his spite in the future, until it is satisfied.’ — Diogenes Laertius, Lives & Opinions, 7.1.114, modified
There may not be an English word that adequately translate this concept of μῆνις (menis). It’s sometimes translated as “wrath”. (I’ve substituted the term “chronic anger” because, once again, it seems to better capture the intended meaning of the passage.) It’s fairly clear, however, that the Stoics are distinguishing, in part, between what psychologists today call “state” and “trait” anger. Anger that is long-standing or part of our character is trait-like rather than merely a passing state. In other words, μῆνις is an enduring character trait whereas ὀργὴ is anger as a state of mind. However, whereas “state anger” refers to a chronic disposition to become angry, μῆνις tends to denote something more intentional, such as a lasting vendetta against someone.
Conclusion
So we have three basic forms of anger:
θυμός, thumos, incipient anger, the initial involuntary phase of the emotion
ὀργὴ, orgē, anger, the standard term used for anger as an emotional state of mind
μῆνις, menis, chronic anger, an angry personality trait or long-standing disposition
For Stoics, the initial phase of the emotion, or proto-passion, is involuntary and only becomes a full-blown emotion when reason goes along with it and gives assent to the accompanying impressions. This is not unlike the modern cognitive appraisal theory of emotion, which holds that the fight or flight response may trigger sympathetic nervous system arousal, such as increased heart rate, and so on, but does not really become an emotion until we interpret the situation and begin to think of our initial feelings either as anger or fear.
Note. Translations from Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus are based on those published in Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson’s Hellenistic Philosophy, 2nd Edition (1997), and modified in instances where I’ve indicated. Quotes from Seneca’s On Anger are from the translation in Robert A. Kaster and Martha C. Nussbaum’s Seneca: Anger, Mercy, Revenge (2010).